This article focuses on the commercialization of urban water services in Zambia. It aims to demonstrate the tension between cost recovery and service extension when water sector reforms combine investment cuts with price increases. It is argued that in low-income economies where infrastructure limitations are serious and poverty is widespread, heavy reliance on 'tariff rationalization' with low levels of investment can lead to reduced access to water and render water charges unaffordable. Reforms to public services can prove futile in the absence of upfront resources for investment in the restoration and extension of the existing infrastructure. In many ways, Zambia typifies other low-income economies; this study thus offers useful lessons for them.
INTRODUCTION
Halving the estimated 1.1 billion people without access to safe drinking water by 2015 is one of the Millennium Development Goals. At the current rate of progress it is unlikely that this target will be achieved in many parts of the developing world.
According to the most recent Human Development Report, 2040 is a more likely date for this goal to be reached in Africa unless there is accelerated investment in the sector (UNDP, 2006) .
A water sector crisis in Africa followed the recessionary conditions of the 1970s, when many suppliers found themselves in a financial vicious circle caused by a decline in government funding of capital expenditure, low tariffs, low billing, low revenue collections and increasing demand for water (Shirley, 2002) . The neoliberal solution to problems in the water sector has been privatization. However, the experiments of more than a decade have shown that privatization of water services was a poor policy prescription, involving 'spectacular failures' in the words of UNDP (2006: 92) . Problems have been associated with the difficulty of establishing competitive market structures (Estache et al., 2005; Kessides, 2004; , ineffectiveness of regulation in the presence of information asymmetries and incomplete contracts (Martimort, 2006) , and negative welfare effects (Bayliss, 2003; Dagdeviren, 2006; Ugaz and Price, 2003) . Over the years, the confidence of the public in the benefits of utility privatization and that of the private sector in the profitability of developing country utilities, especially water, have dwindled. Private investment in infrastructure projects has declined and many existing private operations have been subject to re-negotiation (Hall and Lobina, 2004; Harris, 2003) .
In many low-income economies, investment needs in the water sector are colossal and the affordability of rising water tariffs is usually a problem. Hence, neither full privatization, nor public-private partnerships which do not involve substantial transfers from the public sector, are attractive for the multinational investors who dominate the water sector Lobina, 2005) . As a result, the commercialization of services under public corporations has become the de facto policy in many countries such as Zambia. Indeed, current trends in the low-income economies are increasingly being determined by corporatization of existing public suppliers and commercialization of services (Estache et al., 2005; Prasad, 2006; Smith, 2006) . This is sometimes used as an intermediate step before further privatization, as in the case of water supply in Lusaka.
The stated aims of commercialization in the water sector are cost recovery and improved access to water (McDonald, 2002) . Apart from organizational changes (the creation of commercial utilities and their separation from the municipal authorities, introduction of regulatory mechanisms, etc.), under the new framework suppliers are required to improve their billing and revenue collection rates, reduce overstaffing and rationalize tariffs in an effort to achieve full cost recovery. In practice, in low-income countries enduring a prolonged period of economic austerity, the commercialization of water services has been an instrument for governments to relinquish their responsibility for funding investments in network expansion. While, in general, water sector reforms for improving efficiency, service quality and access are welcome, heavy reliance on tariff rationalization without paying much attention to investment and maintenance needs could be a serious problem.
This article aims to demonstrate that cost recovery through corporatization of suppliers and commercialization of services is likely to be unattainable under conditions of serious infrastructure limitations (such as a small and ageing network) when reforms are based on tariff rationalization and cuts in capital expenditure. This strategy creates a sequence of problems such as unaffordable water tariffs, reduced access to water and greater inefficiency. It is argued that up-front investment for the renewal and extension of the existing infrastructure is likely to be more effective in reducing the costs of maintenance and 'unaccounted for water' and making better use of economies of scale in the sector.
The discussion is based on, and supported by, a case study of urban water services in Zambia. The characteristics of Zambia and its water sector in many ways typify those of other low-income economies with, for example, high levels of poverty, limited access to water and a crumbling water network in the urban centres.
Hence, its experience with commercialization and the lessons associated with it should be highly relevant elsewhere. After setting out the background and context of water sector reforms in Zambia, the article assesses the impact of water sector commercialization in terms of current cost-recovery levels by the ten urban water utilities operating in Zambia, the affordability of water charges, and the access rates to urban water supply. The outcomes are then evaluated with an emphasis on the need for prioritizing investment in the sector. Prior to the 1990s, municipal authorities were responsible for the operation and delivery of urban water and sanitation. The infrastructure was owned, maintained and extended by the central government. A different arrangement existed in the Copperbelt where Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines owned and operated the water network and supplied water to the mines, its employees and other residents in the mine townships. Water tariffs in all the urban centres of Zambia were heavily subsidized. Charges were paid as part of rents and were mostly unnoticed by users.
COMMERCIALIZATION OF PUBLIC WATER SERVICES IN
Economic decline took its toll on essential services, including water supply. The crisis in the sector deepened when financial bottlenecks facing the municipal operators -which arose from low billing and low revenue collection -were accompanied by cuts in central government funding following a general economic deterioration after the 1970s. This meant that access to water by the urban population could not be extended; in fact, it has declined slightly since the early 1990s. As discussed below the small size of the system and the ageing infrastructure in many urban centres have inflated the unit cost of accounted water, partly through rising 'unaccounted for' water rates over time . The policy of cost recovery under such conditions has had negative implications for water tariffs, as reflected in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Reform initiatives in the sector were considered as early as 1976 and continued into the 1980s. Most notable were the reforms aimed at commercialization and attempts at privatization: pilot schemes started with the water supply and sanitation system in Lusaka in 1989 and in Eastern Province in 1992, and similar programmes followed in other provinces after 2000. The process involved a number of legislative and institutional changes from 1992 to 2000, including the establishment of a regulatory authority, the National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO). The core objective of commercialization has been to achieve cost recovery in water services. While water companies have been required to improve their operational efficiency (billing and collections) for this purpose, the emphasis of the reform process which started in 1992 has been on increasing tariffs.
As of November 2006, there were ten commercial water and sanitation companies (WSCs) in the major urban centres of Zambia, which contain 90 per cent of the country's urban population.
1 Each WSC has a regional or provincial monopoly in water supply and distribution. As municipal governments are the sole shareholders in WSCs, they appoint the Boards of Directors, which recruit and oversee the performance of senior management of the companies. One of the positive developments in the sector since the inception of the reforms is the role played by the regulatory body, NWASCO (World Bank, 2004 ). More information is now publicly available about the operation and performance of commercial WSCs than about municipal providers and water schemes developed by the NGOs, which were not subject to independent regulation until 2005. Since then, NGO schemes are also covered in the regulator's annual reports, which detail companies' progress in performance and identify their weaknesses. These annual reports seem to have fostered 'yardstick competition' and brought some dynamism into the sector. The availability of information on comparative performance seems to be forcing companies to take remedial actions and to improve their service delivery.
Independent water-watch groups are also emerging to raise the awareness of users about their rights and develop a capacity for dealing with concerns and complaints about water companies.
IMPACTS OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF URBAN WATER SERVICES IN

ZAMBIA
Cost Recovery in Commercial Public Utilities
The interpretation of the success or failure of the commercialization process in the water sector in terms of cost recovery 3 depends on the method of assessment and indicators used. For example, comparisons between the commercial public utilities and local authority suppliers indicate that the performance of the latter group is inferior in terms of revenue collection and cost recovery (NWASCO, 2006) . This is confirmed by MLGH (2004) , which clearly shows that the public commercial utilities generate more revenues and achieve better cost recovery. Comparisons amongst the ten commercial utilities show great variation in cost recovery levels ( Table 2 ). The process of commercialization, however, did not start in 2000 1987 (Coopers and Lybrand, 1988) . When this is compared to the average cost recovery of 67 per cent in 2005 (see Table 1 ) it becomes pertinent to ask what has gone wrong in the process of commercialization.
Apart from the fact that each water and sanitation company has a different cost structure, 4 the failure to cover costs after the commercialization of water services and variations in performance can largely be explained by two factors. First, and perhaps most important, all existing providers suffer from high levels of unaccounted for water (UFW) that make cost recovery a mission impossible. UFW reflects the difference between the amount of water produced and the amount that is billed. Since 2001, the weighted average of UFW rates have remained around 50 per cent; in 1987, before commercialization started, this rate was around 28 per cent (Coopers and Lybrand, 1988) .
With the exception of Chipata WSC, utilities that made some progress in this respect still have very high UFW rates (see Table 1 ). The most important causes of UFW are leakages in the system, due to lack of maintenance and poor infrastructure, and water wastage as a result of unmeasured consumption coupled with fixed payments. Sector specialists and company annual reports also mention vandalism, ineffective accounting and monitoring of customer databases as reasons for UFW (AHC-MMS, 2002 Nkana WSC, 2003) . Given the variety of reasons for high UFW rates, the solutions have to involve a multi-faceted approach. However, the key to all solutions is investment, in repairs and maintenance, in renewing and extending the network, in metering, in systems of monitoring and in human resources.
Second, although the number of bills collected by the utilities since 2001 has increased, on average 25 per cent of the billed amount still remained uncollected in 2005 (Table 1) . Some companies such as Mulonga and Western WSCs had high enough tariffs to cover the unit cost of supply, but were unable to break even because of uncollected bills. Non-payment by both residential customers and government institutions is a serious problem leading to high levels of arrears. Some companies disconnect domestic users with high arrears. Taking these two factors together implies that the water utilities earned revenues for only 37.5 per cent of their production on average in 2005, since half of the water they produced was not billed and a quarter of the billed amount was not collected.
Affordability of Water Tariffs
In Zambia, households have been charged for water according to the housing category they occupy. Families in low-cost housing pay less than those in medium and high-cost housing. Those who use public tap pay the least. Due to limited metering of domestic connections, most users pay a flat or fixed monthly rate, irrespective of the quantity of water they consume.
The commercialization of water tariffs started in the early 1990s. Between 1992 and 1994, the fixed charges for unmetered residential connections more than doubled for medium-cost housing and more than quadrupled for low and high-cost housing in real terms. 7 The new tariffs soon became politically untenable and the government had to lower them. Since the mid 1990s, and especially after the establishment of new commercial utilities from 2000 onwards, there have been further adjustments to water tariffs. The increase in monthly water charges (in constant prices) for selected utilities is presented in Table 2 . 8 In comparison with 1990 (that is, prior to commercialization), the escalation in water charges in 2006 was much greater for the low-cost housing category than for the medium-cost category for all utilities, and greater than the highcost category for some utilities. Nkana WSC reduced water charges for medium and low-cost housing in 2006, after taking over the most financially viable company, AHC-MMS, which supplied the mines in the Copperbelt. Charges for metered connections have been much lower for small consumption (up to 15 cubic meters) than fixed charges for unmetered connections (see Appendix Table A1 ). In fact, connections are not metered. 10 In spite of the successive real increases, water charges applied by Zambian utilities are still the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (Ballance and Tremolet, 2005 ). Yet, the affordability of current tariffs continues to be a problem.
In the literature, one of the most frequently used methods for assessing the affordability of water tariffs involves a benchmark ratio of household water expenditure to household income. The World Bank uses a benchmark set by the PanAmerican Health Organization, that households should spend no more than 5 per cent of their monthly income on water (World Bank, 2001 ). In the UK, the government considers water tariffs to be unaffordable if expenditure exceeds 3 per cent of household income, which is twice the current median spending ratio on water in the country (Sawkins and Dickie, 2005) . A recent Human Development Report (UNDP, 2006) also suggests that no household should spend more than 3 per cent of its income on water.
Although this method may appear rather arbitrary, it can be applied in countries where data limitations prevail, and the results often provide valuable insights. Other methods used in the literature, such as revealed or stated preferences approaches, which approximate 'willingness to pay', may seem more sophisticated but suffer from the same problems of subjectivity (Komives et al., 2005) . In addition, they require more data than are usually available from national household surveys.
The estimates of affordability in this paper are therefore based on expenditureincome ratios. In Zambia, expenditure on water by households without meters is equal to the fixed monthly charges applied by water companies. The results are presented in Table 3 In the final part of Table 3 , the affordability of low-cost water charges is estimated for households in extreme and moderate poverty, using the mean household income for each category.
11 These figures reveal that low-cost monthly payments account for above 3 per cent of the average incomes of poor households in both categories, except for those in the Southern province. 12 In comparison, the estimates for lower deciles appear much higher than those for extreme and moderate poverty.
This reflects the wide disparities in the income levels of the poor. Some caveats are in order here, to emphasize the fact that these estimates are far from being precise. First of all, low-cost housing may not always be occupied by poor households. Secondly, mean urban incomes in each decile in Table 3 reflect the Zambian average, but in some provinces (such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt) average urban household incomes are higher than the national average, while in others (such the Western and Eastern provinces) they are much lower. This may be considered a source of 'estimation-bias', leading to an over-estimation of the unaffordability rates for urban locations such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt. However, since around 80 per cent of the total population in each of these provinces is located in urban areas, and each province contains over one-third of the total urban population, urban income distribution data for Zambia is likely to be heavily influenced by the pattern of distribution in these provinces and a significant over-estimation of the rates of unaffordability is therefore unlikely.
The results in Table 3 , albeit imprecise, are revealing about the number of people in urban areas who experience difficulties in meeting the expense of one of the most essential of human needs, water. The results are even more interesting in a regional perspective. Zambia has some of the lowest water charges in sub-Saharan Africaone reason why stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector push for further tariff rises. Hence, the Zambian case presents policy makers with a paradox. If the lowest water charges (those for low-cost housing) are unaffordable for a significant proportion of the population in Zambia, where average tariffs are already low in comparison to other countries in the region, it seems clear that the aspirations of cost recovery and extending access to water will not be achieved with the current strategy of reliance on tariff increases for generating funds for investment.
Metering may seem to offer a solution, since water charges for metered connections are lower for small users. This would not only lower the bills for households using up to 15 m 3 of water per month, but also encourage all households to avoid wasteful use. Under the current system, price increases have no influence on the quantity of water used because most households are on fixed monthly tariffs. In other words, metering may also reduce the UFW levels. However, there are a number of factors that may reduce the feasibility and effectiveness of metering. First, interviews with sector specialists which were carried out during the fieldwork revealed that in some urban centres metering is not effective because water pressure is low and air in the pipes keeps meters running even when supply is interrupted.
Second, the cost of a meter 13 is quite high for poor households to meet, unless subsidized or paid for in installments. Finally, as the number of connections with meters increases over time, the utilities may change their current pricing strategy and charge higher tariffs for measured consumption, thus eroding the welfare gains from metering for small users.
Access to Safe Water in Urban Areas
In Zambia, access to piped water has always been the privilege of the urban population along the narrow line of the railway from Livingstone to the Copperbelt.
Because of economic decline and reduced capital spending in the sector, not much improvement could be made on the initial rates of urban access to water inherited at independence. In fact, data from different sources indicate that there has been deterioration in the access rates following the commercialization of the services, with some differences in the scale of decline. For example, according to the World Bank The water supply and sanitation companies supplied on average 58 per cent of the population in their service area in 2005 (Table 4b) Complex, for example, is one of the biggest compounds; here the water supply system has been provided by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Lusaka WSC is the manager of the water supply services in the compound and responsible for the collection of bills and maintenance (Dagdeviren, 2007) .
The quality of water in peri-urban areas is known to be poor. Ground water contamination through lack of proper sanitation facilities is part of the problem.
Water supply in these areas is limited, often a few hours each in the morning and in the afternoon. There are also limits on the amount of water households can draw every day. Depending on the supply arrangement, a fixed fee is paid on either a daily or a monthly basis. According to the World Bank (2002) , some poorer households do not participate in water supply systems in the compounds but share the water cards of participating households, while others accumulate arrears or find sources of illegal supply.
Access and water supply problems in peri-urban areas are currently receiving considerable attention because of the agenda set by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The response of the regulatory agency, NWASCO, to the MDG for water is to promote access in peri-urban areas through 'water kiosks' that are run by individual operators for a commission and maintained by the commercial utilities (NWASCO and DTF, 2005) . This strategy is advocated for its feasibility in the medium term, as water kiosks involve low-cost technology and provide for an affordable service. The results are yet to be seen. While the urgency for access to safe water in unplanned settlements and the impetus given by the MDGs justifies such low-cost interventions, there are a number of reasons to be cautious. The kiosk concept is not radically different from existing systems, such as communal taps, whose commercial viability has been problematic. NWASCO recognizes this and suggests that the operators should be permitted to undertake other commercial activities at kiosks to supplement their income. It is not clear who would shoulder the cost of maintenance: commercial utilities, operators or users? The answer to this question has further implications for the viability of this option in the long-term.
TO INVEST OR NOT TO INVEST: A RE-ASSESSMENT
The literature on utility services provides ample evidence of the importance of investment for the performance of utility companies, the efficiency of their operations and the future security of supply in meeting increasing demand for basic services. For the power sector, Hirschhausen et al. (2004) , Neuho and de Vries (2004), and Woo et al. (2003) all highlight the inadequacies of market-based solutions in maintaining required investments and adequate levels of production capacity. Chisari et al. (2003) note that even with regulation and related pricing systems (price caps or cost-plus approaches) there is often too little or too much investment. Hence, he stresses the importance of 'planning' for the current and future security of supply of utility services. Evidence from the water sector similarly shows that the lack of adequate investment makes a crucial difference in performance (Alcazar et al., 2002; Beddies et al., 2004; Shaoul, 1997) .
Public sector utilities can be efficient in many respects (affordability, high revenue generation, cost recovery, service reliability, resource conservation) as long as they involve sufficient levels of investment with long-term planning. This point has been amply demonstrated by successful public utilities such as NamWater in Namibia and ONEA in Burkina Faso (Bayliss, 2003) ; EMOS in Santiago, Chile ; public water suppliers in Korca, Albania (Beddies et al., 2004) ; ESCOM in South Africa and NamPower in Namibia (Eberhardt et al., 2005) .
In Zambia, one of the important reasons behind the commercialization process's failure to turn its stated objectives into reality is that it has become a means for the demand for water that year. The water network is more than thirty years old (Lusaka WSC, 2002) and some pipes in the city's sewer network are more than forty years old (PANA, 2004) .
The Water Supply and Sanitation Development Group prepared a medium-term development strategy for the government to implement during 1994 estimations suggested that the government had to invest between US$ 407 million (a low-cost investment strategy) and US$ 1,553 million (a medium-cost investment strategy) every year during this period in order to rehabilitate the existing system and expand the network to avoid any reduction in access rates. In other words, the government did not plan to extend access to safe water in Zambia in this period, but it did aim to maintain the existing infrastructure and population coverage. In reality, capital spending in the water and sanitation sector by the government during this period represented a small fraction of the required investments, as shown in spending by donors and NGOs went into capital formation in the sector (which is unlikely) and add this amount to the actual capital spending undertaken by the government, the total sums come nowhere near to the required annual investments as shown in Table 5 .
Government funding of capital expenditure in both the rural and urban water supply systems was US$ 0.63 million in 2004. At this rate, the MDG for water is unlikely to be achieved in Zambia because even the most modest estimates based on quick fix solutions, such as the extension of water supply coverage through communal taps (especially kiosks), suggest that around Euros 20 million is needed to meet the MDG target for water (NWASCO and DTF, 2005) .
All utilities in urban Zambia now require further increases in tariffs to enhance their performance and services. A superficial analysis might suggest that higher prices would boost their revenues and help them to invest more. But higher tariffs do not necessarily mean higher revenues: in Zambia, prior to corporatization and commercialization, the local authority suppliers were able to cover a higher proportion of their operational and maintenance costs on the basis of much lower tariffs than have been applied by the current utilities. Other studies have revealed similar findings (Roe et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003) .
Given the evidence on declining access to water and the unaffordability of low water tariffs for a considerable portion of urban households, the commercialization of water services seems destined to be a failure without up-front investment.
Investments in repairs, maintenance and network extension are likely to cut down the costs of production and distribution significantly through reduced UFW rates, which stood at around 50 per cent of the total water produced on average in the urban sector in 2005 (see Table 1 ). Notwithstanding the need to reduce the amount of water wasted by residential users, an important cause of high UFW levels is the poor state of infrastructure, which is likely to be putting upward pressure on unit production costs. Expansion of the network through new investments can also lower the average cost of production and improve the access of the population to safe water.
The ultimate question is how to finance investment in the water sector. Although this question requires further research, the discussion so far points to the funds raised by the public sector (both national and international) as the prime source for financing investment in low-income economies. The evidence in high income economies supports this view. For example, OECD countries provide substantial grants for financing capital expenditure in the water sector. In some cases, the public sector provides the full funding for such expenditure (Komives et al., 2005) . In France, the government fund one-third of the capital expenditure of the private water companies (Dore et al., 2004) . Taking account of the scale of funds required for service extension and maintenance, and the revenue limitations of low-income country governments, development assistance by donor countries has to be an important source of funding.
CONCLUSIONS
Management and operation of water and sanitation services in the developing world are increasingly being commercialized. While reforms for improving service provision are welcome, it is important to focus on the compatibility of the means and ends in the process of implementation. The objective of achieving cost recovery in the provision of water supply services can be a means to increase the proportion of the population with access to safe water. With an inappropriate policy mix, the aspirations for cost recovery can also lead to the opposite result of declining access rates.
In general, reforms can target progress in three areas. The first involves reducing operational inefficiencies, for example by changing systems of management and organizational structure, reducing overstaffing, improving billing and revenue collection. The second entails addressing investment needs in the sector to reduce the cost of production and distribution through improved use of economies of scale and reduced UFW. The third requires increasing the tariff levels and changing the pricing structure to generate more revenue. In determining the composition of reforms, household incomes, poverty levels and the scale of investment needed in infrastructure should all be taken into account.
In Zambia, tariff increases have been at the centre of the commercialization process for cost recovery. Cuts in capital expenditure and measures to improve operational efficiency have also been part of the process. The reforms have been ineffective and the outcomes rather disappointing in some important areas. Despite the variation in performance across the ten commercial utilities, most are still far from achieving cost recovery. Their tariffs are low but nonetheless unaffordable to the majority. Quality of access to safe water in the urban sector has declined since the beginning of commercialization; more households now rely on public taps, boreholes and wells rather than water supply through residential pipes.
The strategy of getting prices right to achieve cost recovery (when the costs are already inflated due to poor infrastructure and the small size of the network) and improve the water network has been tried with little success. It is now time for upfront public investment in the extension of the network and renewal of the infrastructure to reach cost recovery in the sector, with affordable tariffs through reductions in unit costs and levels of unaccounted for water. Without this, there seems little chance of breaking out of the cycle of low investment, weak infrastructure, poor revenue collection and low levels of access to water and sanitation services. 
APPENDIX
